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Article
Cyber-Conflict, Cyber-Crime, and CyberEspionage
David Weissbrodt*
I. INTRODUCTION
Computers and the Internet have changed and are
continuing to change the way governments, militaries,
businesses, and other organs of society manage their activities.
While computers can improve efficiency, they are vulnerable to
The
and cyber-espionage.1
cyber-crime,
cyber-attack,
international community, states, and businesses are still
adapting to the unique set of challenges posed by cyber-attack,
cyber-crime, and cyber-espionage. States are creating military
operations that specialize in cyber-attack and defense to adapt
to these relatively new threats to national security operations. 2
* Regents Professor and Fredrikson & Byron Professor of Law,
University of Minnesota Law School. The author thanks Quin Ryan for her
assistance on this article. This Article was prepared for the Minnesota Journal
of International Law's 2013 Symposium. To see a video recording of the
discussion that took place, please see the Minnesota Journal of International
Law's website, http://www.minnjil.org/?pageid=913.
1. See generally J. Nicholas Hoover, Cyber Attacks Becoming Top Terror
Threat,
FBI
Says,
INFO.
WK.,
Feb.
1,
2012,
http://www.informationweek.cominews/government/security/232600046
(emphasizing the increasing importance of cyber-attacks in modern national
security concerns).
2. E.g., Joanna Stern & Luis Martinez, Pentagon Cyber Command:
Higher Status
Recommended,
ABC
NEWS,
May
2,
2012,
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/pentagon-cyber-command-unitrecommended-elevated-combatant-status/story?id=16262052 (discussing the
United States' own "Cyber Command Unit" known as CYBERCOM, currently
under the purview of the U.S. Strategic Command). Estonia created the Cyber
Defense League in response to the DDoS attacks in 2007. Tom Gjelten,
Volunteer Cyber Army Emerges in Estonia, NPR, Jan. 4, 2011,
http://www.npr.org/2011/01/04/132634099/in-estonia-volunteer-cyber-armydefends-nation, see infra part II.A (outlining the DDoS attacks in 2007). Iran
announced the creation of its own military cyber-unit in 2011. Cyberattacks on
Iran-Stuxnet and Flame, N.Y. TIMES, updated Aug. 9, 2012,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/computermalwa
re/stuxnet/index.html. The United Kingdom developed the Defense Cyber
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In the United States there have been multiple attempts to
address the flaws in the existing legal structures in order to
better address the threat posed by computer network
operations. 3 The first legislative attempt was in April 2012,
when the United States House of Representatives passed a
cyber-security bill "which called for more information sharing
between national security and intelligence agencies and
businesses."4 A few months later a second cyber-security bill
was introduced in the Senate, which would establish "optional
standards for the computer systems that oversee the country's
critical infrastructure."5 Unable to reach a compromise in the
legislature, President Barack Obama reportedly signed Policy
Directive 20 which established "a broad and strict set of
standards to guide the operations of federal agencies in
confronting threats in cyberspace."6 The directive provides
much needed updates to cyber-security protocols in part by
distinguishing between network defense and cyber operations; 7
however, it does not replace the need for legislative action to
protect private networks. 8 At the international level the lack of
standards is even more pronounced and the tenuous
applicability of international legal paradigms to cybersecurity
issues creates uncertainty and difficulty in pursuing any
Operations Group, and also has two units which are working on an offensive
capability to strike back at enemies trying to launch electronic attacks.
Duncan Gardham, Britain Preparesfor Cyber War, TELEGRAPH, Nov. 25, 2011,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8915871/Britain-preparesfor-cyber-war.html.
3. See generally Michael S. Schmidt, Cybersecurity Bill is Blocked in
Senate
by
G.O.P. Filibuster, N.Y.
TIMES,
Aug.
2,
2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/03/us/politics/cybersecurity-bill-blocked-bygop-filibuster.html; see also Ed O'Keefe & Ellen Nakashima, Cybersecurity
Bill
Fails
in
Senate,
WASH.
POST,
Aug.
2,
2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cybersecurity-billfails-in-senate/2012/08/02/gJQADNOOSX story.html.
4. Schmidt, supra note 3; see also O'Keefe & Nakashima, supra note 3
(discussing other legislative efforts prior to the cyber-security bill the article
focuses on).
5. Schmidt, supra note 3; see generally O'Keefe & Nakashima, supra note
3 (explaining the procedural issue the bill ran up against in the Senate).
6. Ellen Nakashima, Obama Issues Guidance on Cyberwarfare, WASH.
POST, Nov. 15, 2012, at A7.
7. Network defense is what is done within one's own network, and cyberoperations are actions taken outside of one's own network space. The
distinction is expected to help guide officials actions and authorize some
cyber-operations that are defensive in nature. Id.
8. Id. (outlining the need for additional cyber-security policy for the
private sector, either in the form of legislative action, or executive order).
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standards or norms.
The legal challenge of addressing cyber operations is
complicated by the broad variety of computer network
operations possible and by the broad variety of potential actors.
A computer network operation could be perpetrated by a lone
hacker who shuts down a government website. That operation
may require a much different response than when a computer
network operation, executed by government agents, causes a
gas pipeline to explode in another country. Identifying a
computer network operation as a use of military force or armed
attack may be analyzed under the United Nations Charter
while other computer misuse may be assessed as espionage or
other criminal offenses, depending upon issues of scale,
attribution, intent, and consequences. Identifying the different
types of computer network operations, as a cyber-attack,
cyber-crime, or cyber-espionage is important in analyzing an
appropriate legal response.
This Article explores different types of computer network
operations and the scope of existing legal paradigms that can
be applied to computer network operations. This Article
examines three recent examples of computer network
operations and analyzes the situations to determine the types
of computer network operation and what, if any, legal
operations apply. Finally, this Article discusses the limitations
of existing legal paradigms, and analyzes the attributes and
weaknesses of the three more prominent proposals for
addresses regulation of international computer network
operations.
II. ESTONIA, STUXNET, AND FLAME: EXAMPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL COMPUTER NETWORK OPERATIONS
A. ESTONIA

On April 27, 2007, Estonian officials moved a Soviet-era
memorial celebrating an unknown Russian who died fighting
the Nazis during World War II.9 The memorial had long been a
gathering place for both Russian and Estonian nationalist
groups, so officials moved the memorial from Central Tallinn to

9. Estonia Removes Soviet Memorial, BBC NEWS, Apr. 27, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hileurope/6598269.stm (specifying the date the statue
was moved, and the significance of the statue); Daniel J. Ryan et al.,
InternationalCyberlaw: A Normative Approach, 42 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1161, 1164
(2011).
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the Tallinn Military Cemetery outside of town. 10 In anticipation
of the move, thousands of ethnically Russian Estonians
protested." The protests eventually turned violent, and led to
rioting, hundreds of arrests, and one death.12 This event began
a series of Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS)13 attacks
launched against several Estonian national websites. 14
Estonian government websites that would generally receive
1,000 visits a day were receiving 2,000 visits every second,
causing the websites to be shut down for several hours at a
time.15 The attacks became more sophisticated and persisted
for several weeks until NATO and the United States sent
security experts to Estonia to investigate and protect the
computers from further attack.16 Estonia initially blamed the
Russian government for the attacks;1 7 others claimed that
Russia worked with cyber-criminals making their large
botnets18 available for misuse. 19 At this time investigations
indicate the attacks were not affiliated with the Russian
government, but rather the product of "spontaneous anger from
a loose federation of separate attackers."20
10. Ryan et al., supra note 9, at 1164; Estonia Removes Soviet Memorial,
supra note 9.
11. See Ryan et al., supra note 9, at 1164; Estonia Removes Soviet
Memorial, supra note 9.
12. See Ryan et al., supra note 9, at 1164; Estonia Removes Soviet
Memorial, supra note 9.
13. Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking: Self
Defense and Deterrence in Cyberspace, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 444-45
(Spring 2012) define Distributed Denial-of-service (DDoS), as a DoS that
launches requests simultaneously from multiple computers, creating a much
larger scale attack on the targeted computers or websites than a simple DoS
attack. DoS is a type of cyber-attack that cripples the computer or websites'
processing speeds or completely preventing a user from using the system by
overwhelming the target with data and requests, id. DDoS attacks can also be
combined with other types of attacks such as malicious software, see id. at
442-43; see infra note 52.
14. CLAY WILSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32114, BOTNETS,
CYBERCRIME, AND CYBERTERRORISM: VULNERABILITIES AND POLICY ISSUES
FOR CONGRESS 7 (2009).

15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 8.
18. "Botnets, or 'Bot Networks,' are made up of vast numbers of
compromised computers that have been infected with malicious code, and can
be remotely-controlled through commands sent via the Internet." Id. at 5; see
also, Kesan & Hayes, supra note 1313, at 443 (describing potential overlap
between Botnets, DDoS attacks, and other types of malicious code).
19. WILSON, supra note 14, at 8.
20. Id.
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B. STUXNET

On June 1, 2012, officials of President Barack Obama's
administration admitted that the computer worm, 21 Stuxnet,
was a joint project between the United States and Israel
designed to disrupt Iran's nuclear program. 22 The "Olympic
Games" program 23 began in 2006 under President George W.
Bush's administration and flourished under the Obama
administration. 24 The Stuxnet worm, developed within Olympic
Games, was first introduced into the Iranian computer system
in 2008, at an underground facility at Natanz, through an
employee's flash drive. 25 Stuxnet was designed to suddenly
speed up or slow down the spinning of centrifuges used to
enrich uranium, causing their parts to break and thereby
crippling the entire uranium enrichment operation. 26 The most
impressive aspect of the Stuxnet worm was that while it was
changing the speeds of the centrifuges, the computers in the
operation room would report normal functioning of the
centrifuges indicating no problems. 2 7
The Stuxnet operation was working successfully until an
error in the programming 28 allowed the worm to be released
after infecting an engineer's computer. The engineer took his
21. Stuxnet is more accurately described as a "rootkit." Kesan & Hayes,
supra note 13, at 442-431. Rootkits are malicious software programs which use
system modification to hide files, processes, programs, and behaviors. Id. at
442.
22. David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped up Wave of Cyberattacks Against
Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 1, 2012, at Al.
23. "Stuxnet" is the name given to the malicious code by computer
security experts studying the worm. Id. "Olympic Games" is the name given to
the program under which Stuxnet was developed by the Bush administration.
Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. (explaining how Stuxnet was introduced into Iran's underground
nuclear facility, and how crucial the "beacon" virus, which was used to collect
information about Iran's nuclear facility, was to designing Stuxnet to attack
Iran's nuclear industrial control systems); see also Nicole Perlroth,
Researchers Find Clues in Malware, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/technology/researchers-link-flame-virus-

to-stuxnet-and-duqu.html? r=2&ref=stuxnet& (noting that researchers
believe the Duqu virus, was the "beacon" behind gathering the information
necessary to develop stuxnet); Duqu: Steal Everything, KAPERSKY LAB,
http://www.kaspersky.com/about/press/duqu (explicating the scope and threat
of the Duqu virus).
26. Sanger, supra note 22.
27.

Id.

28. The exact source of the programming error is unknown; some within
President Obama's administration blame the Israeli programmers. Id.
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computer home with him, and the worm spread when he
connected to the Internet, thereby infecting over 100,000
computers worldwide and exposing Stuxnet to the public. 29
Stuxnet's intent and objective were not immediately clear to
those persons who encountered it. After much consideration the
Obama administration decided to continue the Stuxnet attacks
since the worm was still effectively dismantling the Iranian
nuclear program. 30 The overall effectiveness of Stuxnet is
unclear, with the United States government arguing that it
delayed Iran's nuclear development by one-and-a-half to two
years, 31 while others report that Iran was able to successfully
contain much of the damage caused by Stuxnet. 32 Stuxnet was
programmed to self-destruct on June 24, 2012.33
C. FLAME
On May 28, 2012, the Kaspersky Lab 34 in Moscow
announced the discovery of malicious software codenamed
Flame. 35 The primary function of Flame is to collect
information. 36 Flame steals valuable information from infected
29.

Id.; see also NICOLAS FALLIERE ET AL., SYMANTEC SEC. RESPONSE,

W32.STUXNET
DOSSIER
5
(2011),
available
at
http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/medialsecurity-response/w
hitepapers/w32_stuxnet dossier.pdf; The Stuxnet Outbreak: A Worm in the
Centrifuge, ECONOMIST, Oct. 2, 2010, at 63 (claiming that 45,000 computers
had been infected with Stuxnet); Wayne Madsen, Stuxnet: A Violation of US
Computer Security Law, OPINION MAKER (Jan. 22, 2011), http://www.opinionmaker.org/2011/01/stuxnet-a-violation-of-us-computer-security-law/
(arguing that over 100,000 computers had been infected with Stuxnet).
30. See Sanger, supra note 22.
31. Id.
32. See Jeremy Richmond, Evolving Battlefields: Does Stuxnet
Demonstrate a Need for Modifcation to the Law of Armed Conflict?, 35
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 842, 858 (2012). But see id. at 859 (arguing that even if
Iran contained much of the damage, they were harmed in other ways such as
shortage of certain metals needed for the machines and the psychological
impact of having a secure facility infiltrated).
33. Id. at 856.
34. Kaspersky Lab is a Russian producer of antivirus software. Thomas
Erdbrink, Iran Confirms Attack by Virus that Collects Information, N.Y.
TIMES, May 29, 2012, at A4.
35. Kaspersky Lab and ITU Research Reveals New Advanced Cyber
Threat,
KASPERSKY
LAB
(May
28,
2012),
available
at
http://www.kaspersky.com/about/news/virus/2012/KasperskyLab-and ITU_R
esearchRevealsNew AdvancedCyberThreat [hereinafter Kapersky Lab]
(announcing the discovery of the malicious program codenamed Flame, found
during an investigation prompted by the International Telecommunications
Union).
36. Id.
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computers ranging from, but not limited to, computer display
contents, documents, stored files, password information,
contact data, audio conversations, and monitoring of Skype. 37
The Kapersky Lab found that "[t]he complexity and functioning
of the newly discovered malicious program exceed those of all
other cyber menaces known to date." 38 One reason is size. In
comparison to a study done in 2010, Flame, which is believed to
have been introduced in 2010,39 is nearly sixty times the
average size of other known malicious programs. 40 Kaspersky
Lab researchers announced that while it is likely that Flame is
part of the same campaign as Stuxnet, it appears to have been
written by a different group of programmers. 41 When Flame
was discovered, Kaspersky found that most of the infected
computers were in the Middle East. 42 Iran had the highest
number of Flame infections; Israel, the Palestinian territories,
Sudan, Syria, and Lebanon also had substantial numbers of
infected computers. 43 Many commenters suspect that Israel is
responsible for the Flame program, and while Israel has not
taken responsibility for Flame, they have also done little to
deflect suspicion. 44 The Washington Post has also asserted that
37. See Erdbrink, supra note 34; Kaspersky Lab, supra note 35.
38. Kaspersky Lab, supra note 35.
39. Id. ("Preliminary findings indicate that this malware has been 'in the
wild' for more than two years - since March 2010."). But see Erdbrink, supra
note 34 (suggesting that Flame is at least five years old).
40. Amy Teibel, Flame Virus: Suspicion Falls on Israel, IOL.COM (May 30,
2012) http://www.iol.co.zalscitech/technology/security/flame-virus-suspicionfalls-on-israel-1. 1308148.
41. See Cyberattacks on Iran-Stuxnet and Flame, supra note 2; see also
Kaspersky Lab, supra note 35 ("Although the features of Flame differ
compared with those of previous notable cyber weapons such as Duqu and
Stuxnet, the geography of attacks, use of specific software vulnerabilities, and
the fact that only selected computers are being targeted all indicate that
Flame belongs to the same category of super-cyberweapons.").
42. Ellen Nakasima, Iran Acknowledges that Flame Virus has Infected
Computers
Nationwide,
WASH.
POST,
May
29,
2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/iran-acknowledgesthat-flame-virus-has-infected-computersnationwide/2012/05/29/gJQAzlEFOU-story.html.
43. Id. (noting that there were few instances of infected computers outside
the Middle East, and that Kaspersky data is limited to infections reported by
their customers).
44. Israel's vice prime minister, Moshe Yaalon, drew attention with his
comment that "[wihoever sees the Iranian threat as a significant threat is
likely to take various steps, including these, to hobble it .

. .

. Israel is blessed

with high technology, and we boast tools that open all sorts of opportunities
for us." Tiebel, supra note 40.
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Flame is part of the joint United States-Israeli operation that
was launched prior to Stuxnet in order to secretly map Iran's
computer networks in preparation for the Stuxnet attacks. 45
How should these three different computer network
operations be characterized? How should computer network
operations be characterized more generally? Should computer
network operations be considered a use of force or an armed
attack under the U.N. Charter? When should computer
network operations be considered a criminal offense? When
should they be considered espionage? While analyzing each of
these issues we will revisit the Estonian attack, the Stuxnet
worm, and Flame in order to determine how these situations
should be understood under international law. In order to
understand how they are characterized we must first define
what constitutes a computer network operation.
III. WHAT ARE COMPUTER NETWORKS OPERATIONS?
Computer network operations (CNOs) have been defined
by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff as being used to
"attack, deceive, degrade, disrupt, deny, exploit, and defend
electronic information and infrastructure."46 The term CNO
will therefore be used in this Article to describe any type of
online or computer intrusion or defense. In order to more
narrowly describe each type of CNO for the purposes of this
Article, cyber-attack will be used broadly to describe CNOs
that include attacks which fall under the law of war and cybercrime attacks. The term cyber-crime will refer to any "crime
which is enabled by, or that targets computers."47 Cyberespionage will be used to describe computer operations which
are used for intelligence and data collection from target or
adversary computer systems. 48
Additionally there are three main categories of the
45. Ellen Nakashima et al., U.S., Israel Developed Flame Computer Virus
to Slow Iranian Nuclear Efforts, Officials Say, WASH. POST, June 19, 2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-israel-developedcomputer-virus-to-slow-iranian-nuclear-efforts-officialssay/2012/06/19/gJQA6xBPoV story.html; see supra part II.B (discussing the
history of Stuxnet and the Olympic Games program).
46. CYBERCRIMES: A MULTIDICIPLINARY ANALYSIS 192-93 (Sumit Ghosh &
Elliot Turrini, eds., 2010) (citing UNITED STATES JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
INFORMATION OPERATIONS, 3-13 (Joint Chiefs of Staff, Feb. 13, 2006),

available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new-pubs/jp3-13.pdf).
47.
48.

WILSON, supra note 14, at 4.
Id. at 12.
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mechanism of CNOs: malicious software, unauthorized remote
intrusions, and DOS attacks. 49 Malicious software or malware
usually infects computers through infected emails or websites
modifying the programs to carry out functions that were not
originally intended.5 0 Unauthorized remote intrusions occur
when the attacker is able to access a computer through account
names and/or passwords and is then able to disrupt the
computer and data within.5 ' Third, DOS attacks overwhelm the
targeted computer system with requests and information until
it ceases to function, thereby denying access to legitimate
users. 52 Any of these CNOs may be specifically tailored for a
particular purpose which further complicates the identification
of which legal paradigm should apply to a particular CNO.
IV. LEGAL PARADIGMS FOR COMPUTER NETWORK
OPERATIONS
A. THE U.N. CHARTER AND USE OF FORCE
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter sets forth the fundamental
international law prohibition on the use of force, stating that,
"all members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." 53 There
are two exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force in
Article 2(4). First, Articles 39 and 41 provide that the U.N.
Security Council may take action by air, sea, or land forces to
maintain or restore international peace and security. 54 Second,
Article 51 also authorizes use of force in self-defense, stating
49. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 13, at 442; Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving
the Dilemma of State Responses to Cyberattacks:A Justificationfor the Use of
Active Defenses Against States Who Neglect Their Duty to Prevent, 201 MIL. L.
REV. 1, 13-14 (2009). Cf. LEHTINEN ET AL., COMPUTER SECURITY BASICS 79-

95, 112-33 (2d ed. 2006) (categorizing cyber-attacks in two groups: viruses
and Internet vulnerabilities); ANDREW COLARIK, CYBER TERRORISM, POLITICAL

AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 84 (2006) (categorizing cyber-attacks into 4
groups: viruses, denial-of-service attacks, web defacements, and unauthorized
penetration).
50. See Sklerov, supra note 49, at 15-17 (explaining the range of
malicious software, including viruses, worms, Trojan horses, rootkits, exploits,
and zombies).
51. Id. at 17.
52. Id. at 16-17; see also id. at 16 (describing DDoS attacks, which launch
coordinated attacks from multiple computers).
53. U.N. Charter art. 2, T 4.
54. U.N. Charter art. 39, 41.
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that, "nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations."5 5 Under these
fundamental provisions no nation may use force against
another nation unless it is authorized by the U.N. Security
Council or is in self-defense against an armed attack.
These U.N. Charter provisions can be applied to cyberattacks. There has been an international consensus among
scholars and the U.N. that cyber-attacks may be understood
under the U.N. Charter even though such an attack is not
explicitly mentioned in the Charter.56 Articles 2(4), 39, 42, and
51 do not list or refer to any specific weapons but the
International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion on nuclear
weapons found that these provisions "apply to any use of force,
regardless of the weapons employed. The Charter neither
expressly prohibits, nor permits, the use of any specific
weapon. .. ."5 The court went on to hold that the rules of war
under the U.N. Charter apply even as new weapons are
introduced that were not originally considered or even
imagined by the drafters of the Charter. 58 In May 2011, the
United States Department of Defense concluded in its first
formal cyber-strategy that the laws of armed conflict can be
expanded to include cyber-warfare thereby allowing the
application of both Article 2(4) and Article 51 to cyberattacks.5 9 While there is a consensus that the U.N. Charter
provisions may be applied to cyber-attacks, the more complex
question is under what circumstances should the provisions be
applied, and which article will be applied. Under the U.N.
Charter conflicts are generally divided into Article 2(4) conflicts
which involve a violation of the use of force prohibition, Articles
39 and 42 conflicts when the Security Council authorizes use of
force, and Article 51 conflicts which authorize nations to act in
55. U.N. Charter art. 51.
56. Stephanie Gosnell Handler, The New Cyber Face of Battle: Developing
a Legal Approach to Accommodate Emerging Trends in Warfare, 48 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 209, 216-19 (2012).
57. Legality of the Threat of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 22, 1 39 (July 8).
58. Id. at 35, T 78; Handler, supra note 56, at 217.
59. See Siobhan Gorman & Julian E. Barnes, Cyber Combat: Act of War,
WALL
ST.
J.,
May
30,
2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023045631045763556231357827
18.html; Ed Pilkington, Washington Moves to Classify Cyber-Attacks as Acts of
War: US Sees Option of Armed Retaliationas Deterrent Concern over Practical
and Legal Implications, GUARDIAN, June 1, 2011, at 2.
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self-defense to an armed attack. 60
1. Prohibition on the Use of Force: Article 2(4)
The drafters of the U.N. Charter intended to prohibit all
types of force, except when done in self-defense or as
authorized by the U.N. Security Council.61 The Security
Council was intended to be the primary body for determining
when force should be used. It was also to have its own military
force which could use force when needed to maintain
international peace and security. 62
What constitutes a threat of force under Article 2(4) is still
relatively vague, but Professor Wingfield testified to the
National Research Council's report drafting committee that
some threats that might constitute "threats of force" under
Article 2(4) include "verbal threats, initial troop movements,
initial movements of ballistic missiles, massing of troops on a
border, use of fire control radars, and interference with early
warning or command and control systems." 63 Cyber-attacks
will be compared to the items on this non-exhaustive list to
determine whether they constitute a threat of force.
Today, there is no clear definition of what constitutes use
of force. 64 The U.N. Charter does not define use of force, nor has
any international body.6 5 Some scholars have argued that
giving the term "use of force" a definite meaning is an
impossible task; the term is imprecise. 66 This imprecise
60. Scott J. Shackelford & Richard B. Andres, State Responsibility for
Cyber Attacks: Competing Standardsfor a Growing Problem, 42 GEO. J. INT'L
L. 971, 995-96 (Summer 2011).
61. Jason Barkham, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L & POL. 57, 69 (2001); see RUTH B.
RUSSELL, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 456-57, 673-75, 1067
(1958) (covering the intentions of key drafters of the U.N. Charter).

62. Andrew Miller, Note, Universal Soldiers: U.N. Standing Armies and
the Legal Alternatives, 81 GEO. L.J. 773, 779-83 (1993); see Barkham, supra
note 61, at 69.
63. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS, TECHNOLOGY,
POLICY, LAW AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF
CYBERAT'TACK CAPABILITIES 242 (William A. Owens et al. eds., 2009).
64. For a discussion the history and progression of the legal
understanding of the "use of force" see James N. Bond, Peacetime Foreign
Data Manipulation as One Aspect of Offensive Information Warfare:
Questions of Legality Under the United Nations Charter Article 2(4) 48-80
(June 14, 1996) (unpublished M.A. final report, Naval War College) (available
at http://www.au.af.millaulawc/awcgate/navy/nwc-bond.pdf).
65. Id. at 50-51.
66. Id. at 51 ("I suffer from no delusions about giving this phrase [use of
force] precise meaning either. It is an impossible task.").
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meaning makes it difficult to determine if or when a cyberattack should be considered "force."
Fortunately, there are some parameters to help identify
use of force despite the lack of a precise definition. Attacks
which utilize conventional weapons are considered to be the use
of force under the U.N. Charter.6 7 Attacks which cause damage
to physical or real property or injury or death to humans are
also considered to involve the use of force. The International
Court of Justice also established in the case of Nicaragua v.
United States of America that arming and training a rebel
group constituted a use of force, but supplying of funds to a
rebel group and United States military maneuvers held near
the border did not involve the threat or use of force.68 The court
also found that the laying of mines by the United States in the
territorial waters of Nicaragua constituted a use of force, but
that use of force did not rise to the level of an armed attack.6 9
Furthermore, international law has established that economic
and political coercion are expressly excluded from the definition
of the use of force, despite the attempts of developing states to
include them. 70 Therefore, most scholars have determined that
67. Id. at 58; see Barkham, supra note 61, at 72.
68. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
227-38 (June 27) (determining that although these
actions did not constitute a use of force under the U.N. Charter, it was an act
of intervention); see Barkham, supra note 61, at 75.
69. Id. In 1949, the International Court of Justice found that Albania had
"used force" against Britain. The British Royal Navy had swept the North
Corfu Channel for mines to ensure that it was a safe route for navigation. On
May 15, 1949, an Albanian gun battery fired at two British warships passing
through the channel. The International Court of Justice determined that the
firing at British ships constituted a use of force in violation of Article 2(4) of
the U.N. Charter. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 12-14, 19, 27,
34-37 (Apr. 9) (Merits).
70. Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in
International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 885, 908 (1999); see Janie Chuang, The United States as A
Global Sheriff: Using Unilateral Sanctions to Combat Human Trafficking, 27
MICH. J. INT'L L. 437, 459-60 (2006) (arguing that Article 2(4) does not bar
economic intervention or non-forcible intervention); ADVISORY COUNCIL ON
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (AIV) & ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ISSUES OF PUBLIC

INTERNATIONAL LAw (CAVV), CYBER WARFARE 20 (2011) (hereinafter
Advisory Council) ("Purely economic, diplomatic and political pressure or
coercion is not defined as use of force under article 2, paragraph 4."). There is
a minority viewpoint that economic force or political coercion should be
considered force under Article 2(4). Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States, G.A. Res. 3281(XXIX), U.N Doc. A/RES/29/3281, art. 32 (Dec. 12, 1974)
(prohibiting states from using economic sanctions to subordinate a state's
sovereign rights); Comment, The Use of Nonviolent Coercion: A Study in
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economic force and political coercion do not constitute use of
force under Article 2(4) while armed force does.
Scholars have proposed two primary approaches to
determine when armed force has been used in violation of
Article 2(4). Michael Schmitt has proposed a seven factor test
in order to determine when state action constitutes armed
force, prohibited under Article 2(4), and when it constitutes
economic force or political coercion, and must be approached
outside of the use of force limit of Article 2(4).71 Schmitt's seven
factor test includes: severity, immediacy, directness,
invasiveness, measurability, presumptive legitimacy, and
responsibility. 7 2 #1 Severity: When actions involve harm to
individuals and property that alone will amount to use of force,
while those that result in minor inconvenience or irritation will
not. 7 3 Within this framework CNOs that impact critical
national interests are more likely to constitute a use of force
and the scale, scope, and duration of the effects will be
considered when determining the severity of the attack. 74 #2
Immediacy: How quickly the effects occur after the CNO. #3
Directness: The greater connection between the attack and the
effect the more likely it can be considered a use of force.75 #4
Invasiveness: The more securely defended the system that is
attacked the more likely it will be considered a use of force. 76 #5
Measurability: The more the impact of the CNO can be
identified and quantified the more likely the state's interest is
to be viewed as affected.77 #6 Presumptive Legitimacy: If the
activity has not been banned, then it is permitted.7 8 #7
Responsibility: A state must be held responsible in order for the
actions to be deemed a use of force. 79 Through this approach a
CNO operation can be analyzed to determine if the CNO
reaches the level of use of force or whether they are better
Legality Under Article 2(4) of the Charterof the United Nations, 122 U. PA. L.
REV. 983, 988 (1974) ("This Comment will argue for a broad interpretation of
the word 'force' in Article 2(4)-in particular, its extension to include political
and economic coercion.").
71. Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the Jus Ad Bellum
Revisited, 56 VILL. L. REV. 569, 576-77 (2011).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 576.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 576-77.
78. Id. at 577.
79. Id.
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placed outside the use of force boundary.80 However, this test is
not universally followed. Schmitt's analysis has been criticized
by some scholars as being too subjective and needing too much
information to be practically applied.8 1
The second proposed approach to determine when an
activity qualifies as a use of force is to establish a broad,
result-oriented analysis which looks at the impact of the
actions, or the severity of the action, to see whether it
constitutes a use of force. 82 According to Schmitt analyzing only
the result of the attack, or the severity of consequences of the
attack, is not sufficient to preserve the distinction between
armed force and economic and political coercion; instead of
being a mere interpretation of Article 2(4), it would constitute a
new standard. 83 Under the result-oriented approach some
economic force would be considered armed force due to its
impact. 84 The results-oriented approach therefore conflicts
with the current interpretation that use of force does not
include economic force.85
2. Use of Force Authorized by the Security Council:
Articles 39 and 42
The Security Council is authorized to use force when its
members have determined under Article 39 that there has been
a threat to the international peace, breach of the peace, or act
of aggression.8 6 Every threat or use of force under Article 2(4) is
considered to be a breach of the peace under Article 39 of the
U.N. Charter and the Security Council is therefore authorized
to use force for any violation of Article 2(4).87 The Security
Council's power to authorize force extends beyond a state's
violation of Article 2(4) and the Security Council may authorize
force at a threshold that is considerably lower than Article
2(4).88 Determining that there is a threat to the peace is a
80.

Rise to
(2009).
81.
82.
83.
84.

See Matthew Hoisington, Cyberwarfare and the Use of Force Giving
the Right of Self Defense, 32 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 439, 448
Barkham, supranote 61, at 85-87; Handler, supra note 56, at 229.
Schmitt supra note 62 at 917.
Id. at 917-19.
Barkham, supranote 61, at 86.

85.

Id.

86.

U.N. Charter arts. 39, 42.

87.

THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 119 (Bruno

Simma ed., 1994).
88.

Id.
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political decision, not a legal decision.8 9 There are no territorial
limits, requirement that a threat be a state action, or that
violence needs to occur for the Security Council to determine
that there is a threat to the peace. 90 Once the Security Council
has made a threat to the peace determination, there is no
mechanism for reviewing this decision; the Council's
determination is final.9 1 Scholars have concluded, based on
Security Council decisions, that threats to the peace include
but are not limited to extreme intrastate violence, severe
human rights violations, apartheid, and cross-frontier
expulsion of a large number of refugees. 92
While the Security Council has full capacity to authorize
the use of force when there is a threat to international peace,
Article 39 determinations and recommendations to use force by
the Security Council are difficult to achieve and are therefore
rare. 93 The Security Council has the full authority to label any
CNO a threat to the peace, but they are unlikely to do so. 9 4
Decisions to use force under Articles 39 and 42 are determined
after extensive debates and deliberations, and during voting
any decision to use force may be blocked through a veto made
by any of the permanent members of the Security Council.95 "In
light of Russia's and China's presence on the Council (cyber
operations regularly emanate from their territory), this
limitation may well prove the greatest obstacle to effective U.N.
action in the face of those cyber operations which would in
some fashion endanger international stability."96 Due to the
extensive deliberations and permanent member veto it is
89. Schmitt, supra note 71, at 584.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. WALTER GARY SHARP, SR., CYBERSPACE AND THE USE OF FORCE ix
(Aegis
Research
Corporation
1999)
at
150,
http://www.cse.msstate.edu/-cse6243/readings/CyberSpace%/o20and%/20the%20
Use%200f 0 o2OForce%/20-%/20Sharpl999.pdf.

93.

David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NAT'L

SECURITY L. & POL'Y 87, 88-89 (2010). The Security Council's activism has
varied over time. During the Cold War (1949-1987) the Security Council
established only thirteen peacekeeping operations. During the ten year period
between 1988 and 1998 the Security Council sent 36 peacekeeping missions.
Since this large increase following the end of the Cold War Security Council
activism has leveled off and has not shown any large increases or decreases.
DAVID WEISSBRODT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND
PROCESS 15 (4th ed. 2009).
94. Schmitt, supra note 71, at 584.
95. U.N. Charter, art. 27; Graham, supra note 93, at 89.
96. Schmitt, supra note 71, at 586.
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unlikely that the Security Council would respond in a timely
manner or even respond at all to a cyber-attack. Therefore, it is
more likely for states to respond to cyber-attacks in selfdefense without Security Council authorization. 97
3. Armed Attack: Article 51
Article 51 permits the use of force in self-defense against
an armed attack. 98 If the action does not rise to the level of an
armed attack, states have no right to respond with force. If the
action does not reach the threshold of an armed attack, then
the victim state may only respond with non-forceful actions,
countermeasures,9 9 and seek recourse from the Security
Council. The distinction between what constitutes a use of force
and what amounts to an armed attack is important because an
armed attack allows a victimized nation to respond with
force.100 According to the International Court of Justice in
Nicaragua v. United States of America, an armed attack must
exhibit certain "scale and effects."o1 Unfortunately, the court
did not go on to determine the required criteria for when an
attack reaches this threshold. Scholars have determined that
with the contemporary methods of warfare an attack should be
measured qualitatively and not quantitatively, so the
determination is not dependent on the numbers affected by the
attack but instead the overall scope of the attack.102 Scholars
have suggested several approaches to determining when an
attack reaches the level of an armed attack, the
97. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 13, at 511 ("Because of the complicated
nature of gaining Security Council approval for a use of force, some argue that
it is more likely that a state would use self-defense to respond to a
cyberattack in lieu of seeking Security Council approval.").
98. U.N. Charter art. 51.
99. U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, in Rep. of the Int'l Law
Comm'n, 53d sess, Apr. 23-June 1 & July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, art. 49 cmt. 1, U.N.
Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9 6_2001.pd
f ("Countermeasures may only be taken by an injured State in order to induce
the responsible State to comply with its obligations under Part Two, namely,
to cease the internationally wrongful conduct, if it is continuing, and to
provide reparation to the injured State. Countermeasures are not intended as
a form of punishment for wrongful conduct, but as an instrument for achieving
compliance with the obligations of the responsible State under Part Two.").
100. U.N. Charter art. 51.
101. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
V. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 195 (June 27) (Judgment).
102. See Schmitt, supra note 71, at 589.
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instrumentality-based approach, the target-based approach
and the consequence-based approach. The consequence-based
approach has emerged as the dominant method for determining
when the "scale and effects" have reached the required level to
be considered an armed attack.
The first approach, which drafters of the U.N. Charter
originally intended to be used, is to analyze the instrumentality
that is used in the attack. 103 This approach focuses on what
type of force the state is using. Since traditional instruments of
force have been defined by their physical characteristics, such
as a bomb, tank, or missile, this approach was originally
appropriate.104 Today, this approach is not applicable to cyberattacks because they do not conform to the required physical
characteristics. Cyber-attacks are conducted entirely through
cyber-space and therefore lack the requirement of being a
traditional military instrument.105
The second approach is known as the target-based
approach and focuses on the intended target of the attack.10 6
The target-based approach is simple to apply because if the
attack is aimed at critical national infrastructure, it is
considered to be an armed attack no matter what the actual
damage iS.107 Allowing a use of force in response to a CNO
which only meets the requirement of being aimed at critical
national infrastructure would allow an expansion of the ability
to use force in a manner not intended by the drafters of the
U.N. Charter.
The third approach, which has the most support, is the
consequence-based approach or equivalent-effects test. The
consequence-based approach focuses not on what approach the
country used but instead on the end result or the effect of the
particular approach.os "Applying the consequence-based
approach, armed attack must also be understood in terms of

103. Wolfgang

McGavran,

Intended Consequences: Regulating Cyber

Attacks, 12 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 259, 269-70 (2009).
104. Handler, supra note 56, at 227.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 228-29.
107. Id. Critical national infrastructure includes: government, information
and communications, banking, food, water, public health, emergency services,
defense industrial base, energy, transportation, chemical industry and
hazardous materials, and posting and shipping. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND
SEC., NAT'L INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PLAN 103 (2009).
108. Handler, supra note 56, at 228-29.
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the effects typically associated with the term 'armed."'10 9 An
attack is considered to be "armed" if it results in the death or
injury to people or destruction of property and other tangible
objects. 110 Under this approach the consequences of an attack,
such as a cyber-attack, need to be analogous to the effects of a
classic military operation.11 Scholars emphasize different
aspects of the attack including severity or destructive effects
and immediacy to determine whether it rises to the level of a
classic military operation, but under this approach the focus is
on the consequences of the attack.112 Cyber-space operations
may by themselves constitute an armed attack, such as when a
cyber-attack destroys its target.113 CNOs may also support
traditional military operations, aiding the fighters by
disrupting enemy defenses thereby allowing forces to destroy
the target without having to physically destroy their defense
system. 114 Since the traditional military attack will generally
constitute an armed attack, it is usually unnecessary to
determine whether the cyber-attack would also be considered
an armed attack thereby activating the right to self-defense.
Since the consequence-based method is supported by most
scholars to determine the requisite "scale and effects" to
constitute an armed attack the situations discussed further in
this article will be analyzed using this method.
Under Article 51, a classic military armed attack activates
the target nation's right to respond in self-defense.11 5 A nation
responding to an armed attack must fulfill the requirements of
necessity, proportionality, and immediacy. The principle of
necessity requires that "non-forcible remedies must either
prove futile in limine or have in fact been exhausted in an
unsatisfactory manner."e1 6 The attack must be traced back to a
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Michael N. Schmitt, supra note 71, at 588.
Id.
Id.
See Stephanie Gosnell Handler, supra note 56, at 228-29.
Id. at 216.

114.

See Id.

115. U.N. Charter art. 51.
116. Yoram Dinstein, Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defense, in
COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 99, 109 (Michael N.

Schmitt & Brian T. O'Donnell eds., Naval War College 2002); see Graham H.
Todd, Armed Attack in Cyberspace: Deterring Asymmetric Warfare with an
Asymmetric Definition, 64 A.F. L. REV. 65, 98 (2009) ("Necessity involves
whether effective peaceful means of resolution exist[,] the nature of the
aggression, each party's objectives, and the likelihood of effective intervention
by the international community.").
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specific source, the targeted nation must uncover the intention
behind the attack to ensure that it was not an accident, and
come to the conclusion that the state needs to respond with
force.117 Proportionality requires that the response should
reflect a modicum of symmetry between the response and the
original attack, and should only use the amount of force needed
to stop an ongoing attack or future attacks. 118 Immediacy
requires that the defensive action not be too tardy.119 This
condition is read broadly and responsive action may sometimes
be taken days, weeks, or even months after the original
attack. 120
An additional consideration is whether anticipatory selfdefense is permitted under the U.N. Charter. Anticipatory selfdefense occurs when a nation acts in self-defense before it is
the victim of an actual armed attack.121 Scholars disagree as to
whether Article 51 permits anticipatory self-defense.12 2

Some

scholars believe that Article 51 limits self-defense until after
an armed attack occurs. 123 But in analyzing claims of selfdefense, governments and scholars have often invoked the
Caroline Criteria, which were developed by the United States
Secretary of Defense Daniel Webster in 1837.124 Under this
framework, anticipatory self-defense is lawful when there is a
necessity of self-defense that is instant, overwhelming, leaves
no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. 12 5 In
addition, the response cannot be unreasonable or excessive.1 26
The Caroline Criteria have been viewed as customary
international law in applying anticipatory self-defense under
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.127 State practice, however,
following the adoption of the U.N. Charter does not provide a
clear conclusion as to whether acting in anticipatory self117. Dinstein, supra note 116.
118. Id.; David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NAT'L
SECURITY L. & POL'Y 87, 89 (2010).
119. Dinstein, supra note 116, at 110.
120. Id.
121. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS, ACTORS,
PROCESS: A PROBLEM ORIENTED APPROACH, 862 (3rd ed. 2010).
122. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 13, at 528.
123. Id.
124. JEFFREY DUNOFF ETAL., supra note 121, at 851, 863.
125. Id. at 851.
126. Id.
127. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (AIV) & ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON ISSUES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (CAVV), PRE-EMPTIVE
ACTION 16 (July 2004) (Neth.).
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defense is permitted. 128
B. CYBER-CRIME

What is a cyber-crime? Law enforcement experts,
commentators, and scholars disagree.129 Some view cybercrimes as ordinary crimes that are simply committed using a
high tech computer.130 They assert that these crimes should
therefore be prosecuted under the traditional laws, such as
trespass, larceny, and conspiracy.131 Others view cyber-crimes
as a new category of crime with unique challenges not present
by traditional crimes, such as issues regarding jurisdiction,
international cooperation, intent, and offender identification.13 2
Different states have their own criminal codes which define
what cyber-activities constitute crimes. The United States has
codified a wide range of cyber-operations which constitute
crimes, including substantive cyber-crime laws1 33 and
procedural cyber-crime laws.134 In contrast to the United
128. Id. at 18-20. See generally Id. at 17-18 (detailing specific situations of
state action and anticipatory self-defense after the adoption of the U.N.
Charter).
129. Eric J. Sinrod & William P. Reilly, Cyber-Crimes: A Practical
Approach to the Application of Federal Computer Crime Law, 16 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 177, 180 (2000).
130. Id.

131. Id.
132. Id. At this point in time Congress has approached computer crime as
both traditional and new. Congress has amended the Securities Act of 1933 to
include crimes committed by a computer, but they have also enacted a new
computer fraud and abuse section that can be amended as technology and
computer crimes evolve. Id.
133. Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, U.S. Dep't J.,
Cybercrime Laws of the United States (compiled by Al Rees, CCIPS), OAS, 1
(Oct. 2006), http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanishlus-cyblaws.pdf. Substantive
cyber-crime laws are laws which prohibit online identity theft, hacking,
intrusion into computer systems, child pornography, intellectual property, and
online gambling. Id. One example is the United States Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act "which has been used civilly and criminally, in situations where an
employer asserts that one has abused a workplace computer to violate the
employer's competitively-sensitive, confidential and proprietary information,
stored on or accessible through computers." The Act also prohibits hacking
into computers to obtain information that has been determined to require
protection from unauthorized disclosures for reasons of national defense or
foreign relations, or any data restricted by Section 11 of Atomic Energy Act of
1954, and unauthorized access to computers of a federal department or
agency. Leslie J. Hagin, Workplace Cyber Crimes, 6TH ANNUAL LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW CONFERENCE 1, 5 (Nov. 2, 2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (West).
134. Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, U.S. Dep't J.,
Cybercrime Laws of the United States (compiled by Al Rees, CCIPS), OAS, 1
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States' large number of cyber-crime laws, there are many
nations which have either ineffective cyber-crime laws or have
not amended their laws to include cyber-crimes at all. 1 3 5
"As a result of rapid adoption of the Internet globally,
computer crimes include not only hacking and cracking, but
now also include extortion, child pornography, money
laundering, fraud, software pirating, and corporate espionage,
to name a few."13 6 One identification issue is the distinction
between hackers and crackers, which creates considerable
problems for categorization. Hackers are people who access
computer systems in order to gain knowledge about how the
system itself works. 137 They like to tinker with computer
systems simply for the enjoyment of doing so and do not intend
to do damage to them. 13 8 Crackers hack the computer system
and then attempt to do damage; they steal information and
cause disruption for either personal, political, or strategic
reasons.139

The cyber-crime model is currently based in domestic law,
but the application of jurisdiction creates several problems
when applied to cyber-crimes. 140 One of the most common
http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanishi/us-cyb_1aws.pdf.
(October
2006),
Procedural cyber-crime laws involve the authority to preserve and obtain
electronic data from third parties, authority to intercept electronic
communications and search and seize electronic evidence. Id. For additional
information on cybercrime laws in the United States and internationally, see
SUSAN W. BRENNER, CYBERCRIME: CRIMINAL THREATS FROM CYBERSPACE
(2010); JONATHAN CLOUGH, PRINCIPLES OF CYBERCRIME (2010).

135. See Nancy E. Marion, The Council of Europe's Cyber Crime Treaty: An
Exercise in Symbolic Legislation, 4 INT'L J. CYBER CRIMINOLOGY 699, 700
(2010); Cyber Crime . . . and Punishment? Archaic Laws Threaten Global
(Dec.
2000),
INTERNATIONAL,
3-4
Information,
MCCONNELL
For
additional
http://www.witsa.org/papers/McConnell-cybercrime.pdf.
information on international cybercrime laws and the views and practices in
various jurisdictions, see CYBERCRIME AND JURISDICTION (Bert-Jaap Koops &
Susan W. Brenner et al. eds., 2006). For information on each nation's current
cyber-laws, see J. Stein Scholberg, Cybercrime Law, CYBERCRIMELAW (Feb.
22, 2013. 12:56 AM), http://www.cybercrimelaw.net/Cybercrimelaws.html.
136. Sinrod & Reilly, supra note 129, at 178-79.
137. Id.
138. Chad Perrin, Hacker v. Cracker, TECHREPUBLIC IT SECURITY BLOG
(Apr. 17, 2009, 1:20 PM), http://www.techrepublic.comfblog/security/hackervs-cracker/1400. Damage does sometimes occur but it is their lack of intent to
do damage that helps to distinguish them from crackers. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. §
1030 (West Supp. 1999).
139. Perrin, supra note 138. Some crackers also try to do good things after
penetrating computer systems, such as providing penetration testing services,
but most have a malicious intent. Id.
140. Cf. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CYBERSECURITY (Mark F. Grady &
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jurisdictional claims for traditional crimes is the location of the
crime, but identifying the location of a cyber-crime raises
numerous questions. 141 Is the source of the electronic
communication the location?14 2 Where it was originally
received? 143 What if criminal conduct in furtherance of the
offense occurred in the jurisdiction?144 Or did the offender
simply access a computer in that state? 145 It can also be very
difficult to tell where the criminal act actually takes place.
Material may be uploaded in one state or several states, while
the hosting provided may be in another state, or publication
may occur in every place where the material can be received
and viewed. 146 In addition, jurisdictional claims may be based
on the location of the computers, persons, effects, or the
nationality of the perpetrator or the victims. 14 7 Each state may
have its own jurisdictional framework for the prosecution of
cyber-crimes. 148
While cyber-crimes are currently being prosecuted within
domestic law, there have been proposals for the establishment
of an International Criminal Tribunal for Cyberspace
(ICTC).149 The jurisdiction of the ICTC would be limited to the
Francesco Parisi eds., 2007) (arguing that the issues related to cyber-security
are primarily the result of computer owners purchasing less than optimal
security levels and that the "problem is compounded because the insecure
networks extend far beyond the regulatory jurisdiction of any one nation or
even coalition of nations.").
141. Susan W. Brenner & Bert-Jaap Koops, Approaches to Cybercrime
Jurisdiction,4 J. HIGH TECH. L.1, 10 (2004).
142. See id. at 10-16.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. Id. at 15.
147. See id. at 10-21. For a restricted number of crimes countries may also
claim universal jurisdiction. This claim of jurisdiction is for particularly
heinous crimes condemned by the international community. This is a claim of
jurisdiction regardless of the location of the act, the nationality of the
perpetrator or victim, or any protected interest of the country. Germany and
Belgium do currently claim universal jurisdiction for one particular cybercrime: child pornography. The United States currently does not recognize
universal jurisdiction for any cyber-crimes and only asserts this claim for a
few crimes including piracy, hostage-taking, aircraft hijacking, aircraft
sabotage, and torture. Brenner & Koops, supra note 141, at 28.
148. See Brenner & Koops, supra note 141, at 3-26.
149. J. Stein Schjolberg, Recommendation for Potential New Global Legal
Mechanisms Against Global Cyberattacks and Other Global Cybercrimes: An
InternationalCriminal Tribunal for Cyberspace (ICTC) CYBERCRIMELAW (Feb.
22, 2013, 1:45 AM), http://www.cybercrimelaw.net/documents/ICTC.pdf.
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cyber-crimes of most serious concern to the international
community, including violations of a global treaty or set of
treaties on cyber-crime, or coordinated global cyber-attacks
against critical national infrastructure.15 0
It has also been suggested that the International Criminal
Court (ICC) may have jurisdiction over certain cyber-crimes.
At the Kampala Conference in 2010, the states that are parties
to the ICC treaty agreed upon the definition of the crime of
aggression: "[T]he planning, preparation, initiation or
execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise
control over or to direct the political or military action of a
state, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity
and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the
United Nations."1 51 Under this definition, in order to effectively
prosecute a cyber-attack under the crime of aggression, the
prosecution must establish that there was a state action, which
rose to the level of use of armed force, and the prosecution must
establish jurisdiction over the crime. 152 While the definition of
aggression did not explicitly include cyber-attacks and seems
to be limited to traditional armed attacks by state actors, it
could be argued that certain cyber-attacks could be considered
crimes of aggression. 153 While ICC jurisdiction over cybercrimes appears to be a possibility it is a few years off, the
earliest that the ICC could have jurisdiction over crimes of
aggression is January 1, 2017.154
Schjolberg has proposed several different locations for where the court may be
located: 1. Additional provisions or articles may be included in the list under
the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. 2. Establish a special
International Criminal Court for Cyberspace (ICTC) as a subdivision of the
ICC in The Hague. 3. Create the ICTC through a United Nations Security
Council decision. 4. Base the ICTC in Singapore in conjunction with the
establishment of the Interpol Global Complex (IGC). Id. at 15-16.
150. Id. at 18.
151. Int'l Criminal Court [ICC], Assembly of State Parties, Review
Conference, the Crime of Aggression, ICC Doc. RC/Res. 6 (June 11, 2010).
152. Chance Cammack, The Stuxnet Worm and Potential Prosecution By
the International Criminal Court Under the Newly Defined Crime of
Aggression, 20 TUL. J. INT'L COMP. L. 303, 319 (2011).
153. Id. at 320. Cammack argues that under certain situations and a broad
interpretation the Stuxnet worm and others could be considered a crime of
aggression. Id.
154. Int'l Criminal Court, supra note 151; "2. The Court may exercise
jurisdiction only with respect to crimes of aggression committed one year after
the ratification or acceptance by thirty States Parties. 3. The Court may
exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in accordance with this
article, subjection to a decision taken after 1 January 2017 by the same
majority of States Parties as is required for the adoption of an amendment to
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Under the current model what constitutes a cyber-crime is
defined by each state individually. The current international
model for prosecuting cyber-criminals is the same as
prosecuting traditional criminals. If a person violates the law of
a state, they may be prosecuted within that state. If the
perpetrator committed the crime in one state but is located in
another state, the victimized nation may ask to have the
perpetrator extradited. "'Extradition' is the formal surrender of
a person by a State to another State for prosecution or
punishment."155 Extradition is regulated by treaties between
nations. Although the United States has treaties with over 100
countries, there remain many countries with which it does not
have an extradition treaty.156 When an individual has
committed a crime in one country but is located in another
country, the nation wishing to prosecute the offender may
submit a request through diplomatic channels to have the
offender released to the victim nation for prosecution.157
Extradition also requires dual criminality, which requires that
a person may be extradited only when their actions are
criminal in both the state requesting their extradition and the
requested state.158 The varieties of cyber-crime activity, along
with some countries' lack of legislation prohibiting cybercrimes, make it difficult for many cyber-crimes to meet the
dual criminality requirement. 159
C. CYBER-ESPIONAGE

"Cyber-espionage is defined as the intentional use of
the Statute." Id. at art. 15, $T 2-3. Delivering on the Promise of a Fair,
Effective, and Independent Court: The Crime of Aggression, ICCNOW,
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=aggression (last visited June 15, 2012).
155. MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
7-5700, EXTRADITION TO AND FROM THE UNITED STATES: OVERVIEW OF THE
LAW AND RECENT TREATIES 1 (2010).

156. Id. at summary.
157.

Id.

158. Marc D. Goodman & Susan W. Brenner, The Emerging Consensus on
Criminal Conduct in Cyberspace, 10 INT'L J.L. & INFO TECH. 139, 141 (2002).
159. Id. at 223. The Love Bug virus is a good example of how the dual
criminality requirement can be a roadblock to effective prosecution of cybercrimes. The Love Bug destroyed files and stole passwords affecting forty-five
million users in more than twenty countries, causing somewhere between $2
billion and $10 billion in damage. Onel de Gusman created and disseminated
the Love Bug and lived in the Philippines. Since Philippine law did not
criminalize hacking and the distribution of viruses, Guzman could not be
prosecuted in the Philippines or be extradited for prosecution in other
countries which have cyber-crime laws. Id. at 139-40.
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computers or digital communications activities in an effort to
gain access to sensitive information about an adversary or
competitor for the purpose of gaining an advantage or selling
the sensitive information for monetary reward."16o Espionage
does not reach the level of use of force under the U.N.
Charter. 161 Espionage is used by nations at the risk that if their
spies are apprehended in a foreign jurisdiction they may be
prosecuted criminally. In order for spies to be prosecuted they
must be apprehended in the foreign jurisdiction, since a state is
not likely to extradite their own spies to be prosecuted abroad.
"The law of espionage is, therefore, unique in that it consists of
a norm (territorial integrity), the violation of which may be
punished by offended states, but states have persistently
violated the norm . . . 162
Just as traditional spies may be prosecuted if apprehended
in a foreign territory, computer experts who conduct cyberespionage may also be prosecuted if apprehended in a foreign
jurisdiction. However, the opportunity for cyber-spies to be
arrested is reduced compared to traditional spying because
cyber-espionage can usually be conducted from within the
home country. This reduced opportunity for prosecution does
not alter the reality that cyber-espionage is merely another
form of espionage. Therefore, the current domestic and
international laws for traditional espionage can and should be
applied to cyber-espionage.
Some argue that cyber-espionage needs to be treated more
severely than traditional espionage, because cyber-espionage is
more intrusive than traditional espionage, due to the capacity
to repeatedly take huge amounts of data, and because nonstate actors have the ability to effectuate an attack. 163 Scholars
160. Kevin G. Coleman, Cyber Espionage Targets Sensitive Data, SIP
http://sip2008),
29,
(Dec.
TRUNKING
trunking.tmcnet.com/topics/security/articles/47927-cyber-espionage-targetssensitive-data.htm.
161. Anna Wortham, Should Cyber Exploitation Ever Constitute a
Demonstration of Hostile Intent That May Violate UN Charter Provisions
Prohibitingthe Threat or Use of Force?, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 643, 655 (2012).
162. Commander Roger D. Scott, Note, Territorially Intrusive Intelligence
Collection and InternationalLaw, 46 A.F. L. REV. 217, 218 (1999).
163. See Wartham, supra note 161, at 658; see also Shackelford & Andres,
supra note 60, at 979 ("Stephen Chabinsky, a senior FBI official responsible
for cyber security. . . 'A spy might once have been able to take out a few books'
worth of material, now they take the whole library. And if you restock the
shelves, they will steal it again."'). Melinzsky asserts that the severity of
cyber-espionage along with the scale of the theft and lack of risk warrants
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who support this proposition propose that cyber-espionage
should, in some situations, be treated as a use of force or threat
of use of force under the U.N. Charter. 164 In contrast, others
propose that due to the new and unique nature of cyberespionage, a new set of laws need to be developed.165 However,
it is the minority opinion that calls for treating cyberespionage differently from traditional espionage. The majority
of scholars and nations approach cyber-espionage in the same
way as traditional espionage.
The test to determine what constitutes cyber-espionage is
simple. If the CNO is only collecting information, then it is
cyber-espionage. If the CNO is doing more than merely
collecting information, then it is considered to be more than
espionage and may rise to the level of use of force or an armed
attack. While the test is simple, it is often difficult to determine
from the computer code alone whether a CNO's objective is
merely the collection of information, or something more
malicious, since both can use similar technology.166
V. APPLICATION OF LEGAL PARADIGMS TO SITUATIONS
A. ESTONIA

The CNOs against Estonia in 2007 present a unique
opportunity to analyze whether the disabling of their
government websites could be considered a use of force under
the U.N. Charter, an armed attack, or a crime.
Michael Schmitt determined that although the attacks
against Estonia caused no deaths or physical injury, the CNOs
military action. "The severity of the problem of data theft is too great and its
effects too harmful." "The scale of thefts is unprecedented: 'Every year, an
amount of intellectual property many times larger than all the intellectual
property contained in the Library of Congress is stolen from networks
maintained by U.S. businesses, universities, and government agencies."' In
order to steal that much information a spy would have needed a forklift and a
van and would have a high level of risk including the risk of getting caught or
killed. Alexander Melnitzky, Note, Defending America Against Cyber
Espionage Through the Use of Active Defenses, 20 CARDOZO J. INT'L AND COMP.

L. 537, 566 (2012).
164. Alexander Melnitzky, supra note 163, at 564-65 (arguing that cyberespionage may amount to an armed attack under an effects-based approach
because it is the potential for an armed attack that makes the activity an
armed attack and cyber-espionage has that potential).
165. Wartham, supra note 161, at 657. ("The capabilities of cyber
technology simply differ too much from those of traditional espionage, and the
ease with which the technologies for cyber-exploitation and cyber-attack can
be used together demands a new set of laws.").
166. Kesan & Hayes, supranote 13, at 426.
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affected the overall operation of Estonian society and was,
therefore, a use of force.167 Under the seven-factor test Schmitt
determined that the effects of the attack were immediate and
also long-lasting.168 The effects were direct since the DOS
attacks promptly resulted in an inability to access funds,
government websites, and news sources.169 The attacks were
also invasive since they targeted websites and computer
systems that were protected and secured.170 Schmitt
determined that if Russia had been responsible for the CNO,
then it would be considered a cyber-attack and in violation of
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.171 Under the result-oriented
approach it is most likely that the CNO would be considered a
violation of Article 2(4) because the CNO spread panic and
confusion, disrupted the economy, and disrupted key
government functions,172 The results of this attack were
therefore severe and arguably in violation of Article 2(4).
Under the consequence-based or equivalent-effects test,
the CNOs against Estonia would not rise to the level of an
armed attack. The CNOs affected government and other key
websites which were vital to the everyday functioning of
Estonia. However, there were no deaths or physical destruction
as a result of the CNOs. The CNOs could not be considered
similar to an attack by traditional military forces.
Even when assuming the attacks against Estonia rose to
the level of a use of force, the CNOs against Estonia can only be
considered under the laws of war if a state is responsible for the
CNOs.17s Following the CNOs against Estonia, Estonian
officials immediately blamed Russia and charged them with
violating the U.N. Charter.174 Other commentators claimed
that Russia had made large botnets available for use by groups
of individuals so that they could more effectively launch CNOs
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Michael N. Schmitt, supra note 71, at 577.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

172. Id.
173. See U.N. Charter art. 2,
174.

4; U.N. Charter art. 51.

WILSON, supra note 14, at 8; see lan Traynor, Russia Accused of

Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia, GUARDIAN

(May 16, 2007),

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia;

John

Leyden, Cyberwarriorson the EasternFront:In the Line of Fire Packet Floods,
THE
REGISTER
(Apr.
25,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/04/25/estonia-cyberwar-interview/.

2011),
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against the Estonian computer network. 175 Computer network
analysts have found that the CNOs were conducted by
individual attackers from around the world who communicated
mostly through Russian chat rooms. 176
Article VIII of the International Law Commission's Draft
Articles on the Responsibility of States for International
Wrongful Acts implicates that there is state control for actions
when state actors or official organs are "acting on the
instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State
in carrying out the conduct." 7 7 The definition of the word
"control" has been left for the courts to decide. The
International Court of Justice established the effective control
test in Nicaragua v. United States of America.178 The court
determined that a state has control over non-state actors only
when the actors act in "complete dependence" on the state. 179 In
contrast, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) established the overall control test in
Prosecutor v. Tadic.1o The court determined that a state has
control, or that actions by non-state actors are attributable to
the state, when the state has a role in organizing, coordinating,
and providing support for the group. 181
Under the effective control test, the actions of the nonstate actors responsible for the CNOs could not be considered
under the effective control of Russia because, from the
information that has been uncovered, Russia was not directing
the CNOs.182 The CNOs were being sent from one to two
million compromised computers in 100 jurisdictions around the
175. Leyden, supra note 174.
176. Id.
177. Int'l Law Comm'n, 2 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, Part 2, art. 8, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, Chapter
IV.E.1 (Nov. 2001).
178. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 110 (June 27); Advisory Council on International
Affairs & Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law, supra
note 70.
179. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 110 (June 27); Advisory Council on International
Affairs & Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law, supra
note 70.
180. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defense Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Int'l Crim. Tib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
181. Id.
182. See WILSON, supra note 14, at 8.
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world. 183 There is no indication that Russian officials were
directing their operations or that the actors were "completely
dependent" upon Russia. 184 It is unknown whether Russia
made their botnets available to assist the perpetrators, 18 5 but if
this could be proven Russia may be responsible for the
perpetrators' actions because it knowingly provided support to
the attackers. Under the overall-control test Russia would be
supporting the efforts of non-state actors and their actions are
attributable to the state. This would be considered use of force,
and thus could be considered an armed attack under the
target-based approach. The uncertainty regarding the role that
Russia had in the CNO against Estonia makes it difficult to
attribute responsibility to Russia for the cyber-attacks.
The most common challenges under international law are
the issues of responsibility and attribution. Who is responsible
for the CNOs? Were the CNOs conducted by a state? Were the
CNOs conducted by individuals acting alone? Can individual or
group actions be attributed to the state? Identifying who is
responsible for a CNO creates serious difficulties for
distinguishing a CNO as use of force, armed attack, cybercrime,
or cyber espionage. The Internet creates nearly endless
opportunities to hide the identity of an attacker. To identify the
source of a CNO requires associating the Internet Protocol (IP)
address with an individual, group, or state. 186 Attackers can
create stepping stones between the attacking computer and the
system used to perpetuate the attack. 187 Attackers can also
create faulty IP addresses which make it look like another
party is responsible for the attacks.18 8 If the attackers know
how to effectively utilize the Internet, it is nearly impossible to
uncover who is responsible for the attack.
Since Estonia was unable to attribute responsibility to
Russia for the cyber-attacks only individuals and groups who
perpetrated the attacks could be held responsible under
criminal law. It has been difficult to determine who was
responsible for the attacks. At this point, only one individual
183.

Leyden, supra note 174.

184.

See A Cyber-Riot: Estonia Has Faced Down Russian Rioters. But Its

2007),
10,
(May
ECONOMIST
Websites are Still Under Attack,
http://www.economist.comlnode/9163598?story-id=9163598.
185. See WILSON, supra note 14, at 8.
186. Duncan D. Hollis, An e-SOS for Cyberspace, 52 HARV. INT'L L.J. 373,
398 (2011).
187. Id. at 398-99.
188. Id.
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has been prosecuted for the attacks. 189 Dmitri Galushkevich, a
twenty year old ethnic-Russian Estonian, admitted his guilt,
and was fined the equivalent of $1,200 for attacks against the
Estonian Prime Minister and leader of the Reform Party,

Andrus Ansip.190 Galushkevich identified possible targets in

online chat rooms. 191 At this time, no additional individuals,
groups, or states have been charged with executing the
attacks. 192
The cyber-attacks against Estonia reflect challenges
regarding categorization of the CNOs as either a use of force,
armed attack, or cyber-crime. Cyber-attacks do not always fit
neatly into one of these categories. How a cyber-attack is
classified often depends on the test applied. Another issue that
cyber-attacks raise is determining who is responsible for the
attack. The answer to this question may decide which law is
controlling. For instance, Article 2(4) and Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter are only applicable to cyber-attacks if the attacks can
be attributed to the state.19 3 Assigning responsibility, although
difficult, is necessary to determine whether the U.N. Charter
provisions on use of force and armed attack apply or whether
criminal law applies.
B. STUXNET

Stuxnet, at minimum, is considered to be a use of force.
Under some tests, Stuxnet could also be considered an armed
attack as defined by the U.N. Charter. Officials of President
Barack Obama's administration admitted that the Stuxnet
computer worm was a joint project between the United States
and Israel. 194 This admission by the United States makes
further discussion on state responsibility unnecessary.195
The Stuxnet attack would constitute a use of force under
the U.N. Charter. Under the seven factor Schmitt analysis, the
Stuxnet attack was severe because it caused physical harm to
property. Stuxnet caused the centrifuges to speed up and slow
down their rotation causing them to break.196 The breaking of
189. Leyden, supra note 174.

190. Id.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
Id.
See Wortham, supra note 161, at 648-49.
Sanger, supra note 22.
See id.
Id.
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the centrifuges constitutes a physical destruction of property
that rises above the level of a "minor inconvenience or
irritation."197 United States officials contend that it set back
the Iranian nuclear program anywhere from eighteen months
to two years. 198 The consequences were immediate; Stuxnet
could change the speeds of the centrifuges at the discretion of
the operators causing them to break.199 As such, the breaking
of the centrifuges was the direct result of the Stuxnet worm.
The attack is considered invasive because the Natanz facility
was supposed to be a secure, secret facility. 2 00 Furthermore,
because the United States has claimed responsibility for the
cyber-attack, Stuxnet certainly constitutes a use of force under
Schmitt's analysis.
In contrast, under the result-oriented approach it is
difficult to say for certain whether the attack reached the
required level of severity to constitute use of force. While
Stuxnet only caused centrifuges to break and did not cause
physical harm to anyone, an argument can be made that the
consequences of Stuxnet were severe because the Iranian
program was set back several years. Jeremy Richmond argues
that Stuxnet did more harm than just the broken
centrifuges. 201 Stuxnet caused shortages of certain types of
metals and had psychological effects because it infiltrated a
facility believed to be secure and immune to malware. 202
Additionally, it is likely that Iran had to replace all of its
computer systems at Natanz, a difficult task for a country
under severe trade restrictions. 203 Whether or not these
consequences are severe enough to give rise to a use of force
classification is debatable. That being said, it is likely that the
Stuxnet attack would be classified as a use of force.
Another approach to use of force is the consequence-based
approach. 204 Under this approach, the cyber-attack must be
analogous to the effects of a classic military operation. 205 In this
instance Stuxnet successfully destroyed the centrifuges
197.
198.

See Schmitt, supra note 71, at 576.
Sanger, supra note 22.

199.
200.

See id.
See Richmond, supra note 32, at 859.

201.
202.

Id.
Id.

203.
204.

Id.
See Schmitt, supra note 71, at 587-89.

205. See id.
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eliminating the need to use a classic military operation to slow
the progress of Iran's nuclear program. 206 Stuxnet, therefore,
performed a task that would have otherwise required a classic
military operation. Some scholars may argue that the Stuxnet
attack did not have the required severity or destructive effects
typically associated with a classic armed attack and, therefore,
cannot be considered the equivalent of an armed attack. At the
same time, however, Stuxnet executed an objective that would
traditionally have required a classic military operation,
therefore, the Stuxnet attack should be considered an armed
attack under the consequence-based approach.
Under the U.N. Charter the Stuxnet cyber-attack would
qualify as a use of force and would likely also qualify as an
armed attack under Article 51. Since Stuxnet most likely
constituted an armed attack whether Iran could lawfully
respond with military action in self-defense must be analyzed
within the three requirements of necessity, proportionality, and
immediacy. 207 It is unlikely an Iranian response would meet
the requirements of necessity, proportionality, and immediacy,
therefore, an armed response to Stuxnet would not be lawful.
First of all, a response by Iran would not fulfill the
condition of necessity. The necessity requirement is not met
because there are remedies that Iran could use in response to
Stuxnet that do not require force. For example, Iran could take
action to eradicate Stuxnet from the computer system. If
Stuxnet is no longer present in the Natanz computer system,
then it is no longer a threat to Iran. Iran could also lodge a
complaint with international authorities such as the U.N.
Security Council. Iran took such legal action on June 20, 2012,
when Iran's Communications and Information Technology
Minister, Reza Taqipour, announced that the Iranian Foreign
Ministry complained to relevant international organizations. 208
Iran and the United States could also work diplomatically to
try and reach an agreement prohibiting the use of CNO
206. See Sanger, supra note 22.
207. See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 71, at 593-94.
208. See, e.g., Iran Complains to World Bodies About Cyber Attacks:
Minister,
PRESsTV,
Jun.
20,
2012,
http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2012/06/20/247120/iran-protests-statecyberterrorism/. Iran has yet to disclose precisely which international
organizations have been made aware of its complaint. See id.; see also Iran
Complains of Cyberterrorism, UNITED PRESS INT'L, June 20, 2012,
http://www.upi.com/Science-News/Technology/2012/06/20/ran-complains-ofcyberterrorism/UPI-33471340206675/.
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operations.
A response by Iran would also have to be proportionate to
the Stuxnet attack to be lawful. What a proportionate response
would look like is currently being debated by scholars; some
argue that a victimized nation can only respond with an inkind cyber-attack while other scholars argue that under some
situations a response using traditional military force would
satisfy the proportionality requirement. 209
In addition, any response by Iran would most likely be
tardy and not meet the immediacy requirement. President
Barack Obama's administration did not take responsibility for
Stuxnet until June of 2012, but it was discovered in June 2010,
any response by Iran would have therefore been two years after
the discovery of Stuxnet. 210 Iran also claims to have eradicated
Stuxnet with little overall impact on the Iranian nuclear
program; as such, any action by Iran at this time would be
taken well after Iran eradicated any remaining Stuxnet threat.
Furthermore, Stuxnet was scheduled to self-destruct on June
24, 2012, so any action taken in response to Stuxnet would be
unnecessary because it is past the date that Stuxnet selfdestructed. Given the above analysis, an armed response by
Iran to the Stuxnet attack would not meet the three
requirements of necessity, proportionality, and immediacy and
would not be lawful under international law.
Stuxnet raises several important issues with regard to
cyber-attacks and use of force, armed attack, and self-defense
under the U.N. Charter. The United States took responsibility
for the Stuxnet attack thereby making Article 2(4) and Article
51 of the U.N. Charter applicable. Stuxnet would constitute a
use of force triggering Iran's right to respond with non-forceful
actions and countermeasures. If Stuxnet also rose to the level
of an armed attack, then Iran may respond in self-defense.
Iran would not, however, be able to respond with an armed
attack in self-defense because an armed attack would not meet
the requirements of necessity, proportionality, and immediacy.
The question remains, under what circumstances would an
armed attack in self-defense to a cyber-attack be appropriate?
A nation has yet to respond to a cyber-attack in self-defense,
209. See Kesan, supra note 13, at 512-14. Some scholars argue that
responding to a cyber-attack in kind, instead of by traditional military forces,
is more in line with the principles of international humanitarian law such as
distinction, humanity, necessity, and proportionality. Id.
210. Sanger, supra note 22.
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and scholars continue to debate what type of defensive action
would be permissible under the principle of proportionality. 2 11
C. FLAME

Computer experts who have analyzed the Flame virus have
determined that its primary objective is the collection of
information. 212 Computer analysts at Kaspersky Lab have
asserted that Flame is so large and complex it must have been
created by a government. 2 13 Because Flame was deployed by a
government and because it collects information, it is considered
cyber-espionage. If the cyber-spies responsible for the attacks
were ever apprehended they could be prosecuted for espionage
in any of the states where Flame collected information. The
possibility that they will ever be tried for espionage is
infinitesimal. In order to prosecute the victimized nation would
have to identify the cyber-spies and apprehend them within
their country because the state responsible is not going to
extradite their own operatives. Flame is conducting cyberespionage but could such an action also be regarded as a use of
force?
Identifying the intent behind a CNO may be difficult
because a CNO is merely computer code and deciphering the
intent behind computer code alone can be difficult. 2 14 When a
state is not able to decipher a CNO's intent it may lead officials
to assume that they are under attack. The fear of indiscernible
intent and capabilities of a CNO may lead a trigger happy
nation to respond with force to a CNO that is engaged only in
espionage. 2 15 The fear that states may respond aggressively to
a cyber-espionage operation leads some scholars to assert that
persistent and aggressive acts of cyber-espionage should be
treated as a threat of force or use of force under the U.N.

211. See Kesan, supra note 13, at 512.
212. Kaspersky Lab, supra note 34.
213. See "Flame" Computer Virus Strikes Middle East; Israel Speculation
Continues,
CBS
NEwS
(May
29,
2012,
2:26
PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-501465_162-57443071-501465/flamecomputer-virus-strikes-middle-east-israel-speculation-continues/. "Western
officials with knowledge of the effort" told reporters that the United States
and Israel developed Flame to collect intelligence in preparation for cyberattacks aimed at slowing Iran's nuclear program. Nakashima, supra note 45.
214. See Wortham, supra note 161, at 656.
215. See Herbert S. Lin, Offensive Cyberspace Operations and the Use of
Force, 4 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 63, 82-83 (2010).
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Charter. 216
On one hand, a CNO may only have the ability to collect
information. 217 There are other CNOs however, that collect
information and have the capacity to launch a cyber-attack at
the operator's instructions. 2 18 Furthermore, even if the CNO is
only able to collect information it could potentially be upgraded
with the required capabilities to launch a cyber-attack if
needed. 219 Scholars note that because CNOs may contain, or be
updated with, the ability to launch a cyber-attack, and because
the cyber-espionage and attack operations do not have to be
mutually exclusive, a targeted country will sometimes not
know, and have no way of finding out, whether they have been
exploited or attacked. 220
While the primary objective of Flame appears to be the
collection of information, a CNO like Flame may have the
capability to be upgraded to contain a destructive
component. 221 As is, Flame conducts cyber-espionage because it
collects information on computer displays, and stores data,
documents and other information. 222 However, through an
upgrade in the software, Flame may have the capability to take
destructive action such as "destroying the read-only memory
controlling the boot sequence of the machine where it
resides."223 As such, it could be argued that Flame does not-in
its present state--constitute a use of force because it does not
have any potential to do damage; that being said, Flame could
easily be turned into a destructive agent. 224 When, if ever,
should upgrading a CNO to have destructive capabilities be
considered a threat of force, violating Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter?
It could be argued that a CNO that is conducting cyberespionage but has the capability to launch a cyber-attack is
analogous to initial troop movements or the massing of troops
on a border. The CNO is prepared and capable of launching a
cyber-attack similar to the way troops amassed on a border are
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

See id.at 84.
See id. at 78-79.
Id.
Id.
Wortham, supra note 161, at 652-53.
Lin, supra note 215, at 79.
Erdbrink, supra note 34; Kaspersky Lab, supra note 34.
See, Herbert S. Lin, supra note 215, at 79.
See id.
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prepared and capable of an attack; the CNO is waiting for a
command to attack the same as traditional troops. Some
scholars propose that because of the instantaneous ability to
upgrade a CNO to have destructive potential, cyber-espionage
should be treated as a possible armed attack from the very
beginning. 225 Despite the arguments for why cyber-espionage
such as Flame should be considered a threat of force or use of
force under Article 2(4), most scholars, nations, and analysts
assert that when a CNO is only collecting information it is
cyber-espionage. Therefore, cyber-espionage, just like
traditional espionage, would not be, under traditional
principles of international law, considered a threat of force or
use of force under Article 2(4) until the CNO takes action
beyond collecting data. 226
An additional consideration when analyzing cyberespionage is whether a nation that is victim to cyber-espionage
may ever act in anticipatory self-defense. It would appear that
cyber-espionage, by itself, would never trigger anticipatory
self-defense because cyber-espionage is not instantaneousthere is no immediate threat.227 Cyber-espionage is not
overwhelming because alone, it does no harm. Cyber-espionage
leaves ample time for deliberation because it does not create an
immediate danger. 228 However, cyber-espionage paired with an
exposed vulnerability in the computer software may justify the
use of anticipatory self-defense.229 If a CNO has infected a
computer and is conducting cyber-espionage, if the CNO has
uncovered a weakness in the operations system that is
vulnerable to attack from the CNO, and if intelligence uncovers
that the vulnerability will be exposed for an imminent attack,
then a nation may be able to respond in anticipatory selfdefense. 230 The threat is immediate because intelligence has
225. Melnitzky, supra note 163, at 566-68 (arguing that the distinction
between corruption of data such as in a cyber-attack and the theft of data in
cyber-espionage is an "overly mechanical distinction" that ignores the basic
principle of the effects based approach-the effect is what matters).
226. See Melnitzky, supra note 163, at 564.
227. Cf. Wortham, supra note 161, at 656-57 (arguing that because the
threat of an attack needs to be immediate a nation recognizing a computer
network vulnerability while conducting cyber-espionage will not trigger the
ability to act in anticipatory self-defense).
228. Cf. id. (stating the additional requirements for anticipatory selfdefense: (1) an urgent need to act defensively against the attack, and (2) that
no workable alternative to self-defense exists).
229. Id.
230. See id.
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uncovered that the attack will be launched imminently. The
threat is overwhelming because there may be no time for
computer operators to protect the computer from the attack.
The immanency of the attack leaves no moment for
deliberation.
Under these specifically tailored circumstances, a nation
may be able to respond in anticipatory self-defense to cyberespionage coupled with an exposed vulnerability. 2 3 1 It is
important to mention that this ability to respond in
anticipatory self-defense is undermined if the nation has time
to create network defenses which will protect the system from
the cyber-attack. Applying the circumstances surrounding the
Flame virus, targeted nations would not be able to respond in
anticipatory self-defense unless Flame was updated with the
capability to conduct a cyber-attack, the computer system had
an exposed vulnerability, and government intelligence had
uncovered that those responsible were going to expose the
vulnerability for an imminent attack. None of these
requirements have been met for the Flame operation meaning
that the affected nations would not be able to legally respond
with anticipatory self-defense under the Caroline Criteria.
Schmitt has proposed that anticipatory self-defense may
be used if three factors are present: (1) the CNO is part of an
overall operation that will culminate in an armed attack; (2)
the CNO is an irrevocable step toward an armed attack; (3) the
action in self-defense occurs at the last possible moment to
counter the attack.232 This approach poses a very high standard
which cyber-espionage operations would not ordinarily
reach. 233 A cyber-espionage operation would rarely, if ever,
constitute an irrevocable step toward an armed attack;
therefore, under Schmitt's approach, a state would not be able
to act in anticipatory self-defense to a cyber-espionage
operation.
Flame is a CNO which has the primary purpose of
conducting cyber-espionage. Under a traditional analysis,
Flame does not constitute a threat or use of force or an armed
attack under the U.N. Charter. Some scholars have proposed
that because of the CNO's unique ability to upgrade from
conducting cyber-espionage to cyber-attacks and the inability
to determine the intent of a CNO, cyber-espionage should be
231.
232.
233.

See id.
Schmitt, supra note 70, at 936.
See Kesan, supra note 13, at 516-17.
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considered a threat of use of force or a use of force under Article
2(4). While this proposition is supported by some analysts, most
scholars and nations find that cyber-espionage is the same as
traditional espionage and should be viewed as a violation of
domestic criminal law. Additionally, while cyber-espionage in
itself cannot trigger anticipatory self-defense, cyber-espionage
coupled with a computer network vulnerability may trigger the
ability to use anticipatory self-defense under the Caroline
Criteria. Applying the Schmitt approach cyber-espionage
would rarely, if ever, trigger the ability to use anticipatory selfdefense.
VI. CONCLUSION
Correct identification of CNOs as a threat or use of force,
armed attack, a crime, or espionage depends on the scale of the
attack, attribution, intent, and consequences. The unique
nature of CNOs makes it difficult to determine which legal
paradigm is applicable and what response is legally
appropriate. As the capabilities and application of CNOs
continue to expand, the international community will be faced
over and over again with the task of determining which legal
paradigm should be applied to CNOs.
So what should the international community do to deal
with the threat posed by CNOs? The remainder of this article
will analyze the three main approaches proposed to regulate
CNOs: (1) a non-proliferation treaty, (2) a treaty or code of
conduct containing normative rules and legal obligations, and
(3) development of state practice in a way that will create
existing
norms
which
the
customary
international
international legal regime cannot address.
A. NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

Michael Rake, chairman of BT Group PLC,234 and many
other scholars have suggested that a cyber-non-proliferation
treaty, similar to those for weapons of mass destruction, must
be developed. 235 Supporters of a non-proliferation treaty
suggest that the ability of cyber-attacks to completely
dismantle a state demands the implementation of a non234. BT Group PLC is one of the world's leading telecommunications
companies. Associated Press, Web Summit Considers Cyber-Nonproliferation
Pact, WASH. POST, Jun. 1, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.cominews
/201 1/jun/1/web-summit-considers-cyber-nonproliferation-pact/.
235. Id.
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proliferation treaty.236 There are currently several treaties,
export control regimes, and codes of conduct which address the
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 237 These
non-proliferation treaties make the distinction "between the
nuclear haves and the nuclear have-nots." 238 They require that
those nations which have nuclear weapons reduce their arsenal
and not impair other nation's peaceful use of nuclear energy
while those nations which do not have nuclear-weapons agree
not to develop them. 23 9 Scholars have suggested that a cybernon-proliferation treaty is not realistic because there is no way
of making a distinction between those who have cyber-weapons
and those that do not. 240 Furthermore, ensuring that nations do
not develop this technology would be impossible because the
actual possession of cyber-attack technology can be difficult to
detect; such technology can be developed and tested in secret. 241
The implementation of a cyber-non-proliferation treaty,
therefore, is not a workable solution for the threat posed by
CNOs.
B. CYBER-TREATY
NORMATIVE RULES

OR CODE OF CONDUCT CONTAINING

There are several different approaches which may be used
for developing an international treaty. A treaty may be created
which bans cyber-attacks altogether. This treaty would be
similar to the Mine Ban Treaty which bans the use, stockpiling,
production, and transfer of landmines because of the harm that
landmines cause civilians. 242 Similar to landmines a multinational cyber-treaty banning cyber-attacks would have
support because of the potential negative impact such an attack

236. See id.
237. Advisory Council, supra note 70, at 29. Multilateral treaties
concerning weapons of mass destruction include: 1968 Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT), 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), 1993
Chemical Weapons convention (CWC), and the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear
Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic
Missile Proliferation (HCOC) is also a code of conduct which focuses on
weapons of mass destruction. Id.
238. Id.
239.
240.
241.

Id.
Id.
Id.

242. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction art. 1, Sep.
18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211.
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would have on civilians. 2 4 3 Any use of force in self-defense
under the U.N. Charter requires that it meet the requirements
of military necessity, distinction between civilians and military
targets, proportionality, and avoidance of unnecessary
suffering. 244 Because cyber-attacks can "escape" from their
original target and affect civilians, it could be argued that such
attacks do not distinguish between civilians and noncivilians. 245 In addition, they may cause civilians unnecessary
suffering because when such viruses "get loose" they may cause
unnecessary damage to programs and institutions which are
vital to civilian infrastructure. Scholars and nations have
therefore proposed the creation of a treaty banning the use of
cyber-attacks because of these potentially devastating effects.
A second approach would be to develop a treaty or code of
conduct which deliberately addresses what type of conduct
would be considered a cyber-attack and what responses would
be appropriate under the circumstances. A treaty such as this
would complement and clarify existing regulations regarding
use of force in the U.N. Charter and customary international
law. 2 4 6 Russia has advocated for the establishment of a cyberattack treaty for over ten years. 247 In addition, the
International Telecommunications Union Secretary General
Hamadoun Toure has been a vocal supporter of a treaty in
which countries would agree not to make a cyber-attack
against another state. 248
Scholars contend that a treaty which bans the use of
cyber-attacks or limits their use is not realistic because there
is currently no way to ensure compliance. 249 CNOs can be
developed in secret and tested in secret. In addition, they can
243. See Misha Glenny, A Weapon We Can't Control, NY TIMES, Jun. 25,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/25/opinion/stuxnet-will-come-back2012,
to-haunt-us.html?_r=0.
244. Melnitzky, supra note 163, at 560-61.
245. Cf. Glenny, supra note 243 ("[O]nce released, virus developers
generally lose control of their inventions, which will inevitably seek out and
attack the networks of innocent parties.").
246. Handler, supra note 56, at 236.
247. Id.
248. UN Chief Calls for Treaty to Prevent Cyber War, GoogleNews Jan. 30,
2010,
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5h8UvkjpSvCWT-bqYSglWs4I4yAA.
249. Handler, supra note 56, at 237; cf. Shackelford, supra note 60, at 993
("Despite the support for this approach, both the details for how such a treaty
would function and whether there is sufficient political will to make it a
reality remain uncertain.").
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be coded and routed in a way which makes state attribution
nearly impossible. Nations can therefore not be monitored in
any meaningful way to ensure state compliance with the
treaty. 250 Any code of conduct containing normative rules would
be undermined by the inability to monitor and attribute
responsibility.
C. DEVELOPMENT OF STATE PRACTICE

Stephanie Handler proposes that instead of developing a
cyber-treaty, "[a] better option is to focus on developing state
practice in a rational way that develops patches where the
existing legal regime is not optimally suited to cyberspace
operations." 251 Handler claims that a focus on state practice
that corresponds to current international law will help develop
new customary international law norms. 252 Since it is unlikely
that states will come together to create a cyber-treaty,
customary international law, developed through state practice,
will be the primary method for the formation of cyber-space
laws. 2 5 3 In addition to state practice, the decisions and opinions
of international courts regarding CNOs will assist in the
development of international law norms. The development of
customary international law in the area of cyber-space
operations will take time. For now, scholars must take a waitand-see approach to see how states react to cyberspace
operations and their fast-developing technologies.

250. Handler, supra note 56, at 237.
251. Id. at 238.
252. Id.
253. Hannah Lobel, Cyber War Inc.: The Law of War Implications of the
Private Sectors Role in Cyber Conflict, 47 TEX. INT'L L.J. 617, 638 (2012); see
Steven G. Bradbury, Keynote Address at the 2011 Harvard National Security
Journal Symposium: Cybersecurity: Law, Privacy, and Warfare in a Digital
World (Mar. 4, 2011), available at http://harvardnsj.com/
2011/04/the-developing-legal-framework-for-defensive-and-offensivecyber-operations.

